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WASTE MANAGEMENT
F. Conclusion
Despite industry opposition and shifting political winds, Congress
managed to enact a surprisingly strong piece of legislation. The
"superfund" begins where the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act stopped. Systematic regulation and tracking of hazardous wastes
are now backed by a funding mechanism for corrective action. Still
needed, however, are devices to assure that those responsible for haz-
ardous substance injuries will bear the costs and that those harmed
will receive compensation." 4
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 begins to deal with a massive social and envi-
ronmental problem. Resolution of that problem must await further
changes in attitude, practices, and the law.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR
WASTE DISPOSAL ............................. STEVEN SIMONS
A. Introduction
The proper role of states in nuclear waste disposal is an increas-
ingly debated legal issue.1 47  Under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,148 the federal government is responsible1 49 for management
and regulation of high-level nuclear waste disposal.' 5° Nevertheless,
146. Environmental Action lobbyist Marchant Wentworth labeled the Act "a
property bill and not a victims bill." 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1232 (1980). Similarly,
Senator George Mitchell (R-Maine) found the law deficient "because while it pro-
vides for the cleanup of places and compensation for damage to things, it provides
nothing for what is the most important part of the problem, damage to people." 11
ENViR. REP. (BNA) 1097 (1980). Upon CERCLA's passage, both Rep. James Florio
(D-NJ and sponsor of H.7020) and Rep. John La Falce (D-NY and representing the
Love Canal district) indicated they would seek victim compensation legislation in the
Ninety-seventh Congress. 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1261 (1980).
147. See 65 Ky. L. J. 917, 930 (1977).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
149. Id at § 2021(C).
Although the Act makes the federal government responsible for high-level waste
regulation, some aspects of nuclear regulation may be delegated. See Swan, Manage-
ment of High-Level Radioactive Wastes: The AEC and the Legal Process, 1973 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 263, 286.
150. High-level wastes are a by-product of the reprocessing of spent fuel for fur-
ther use as nuclear fuel. Linker, Beers, & Lash, Radioactive Wastes: Gaps in the Regu-
latory System, 56 DEN. L.J. 1, 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gaps in the Regulatory
System.] Federal regulations define high-level wastes as "those aqueous wastes re-
sulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent,
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states desire a role in permanent repository siting decisions.", State
efforts to regulate repositories face invalidation since federal law
preempts nuclear energy matters. 1-2 Without the cooperation of state
and local governments, however, federal development of permanent
disposal facilities is politically impossible.'5 3 This conflict illustrates
the need for meaningful state participation in siting decisions.
B. State Interests and State Exclusion from Decision Making
Existing federal law fails to provide effective state involvement in
nuclear waste disposal.' 54 High-level waste disposal is specifically
excluded from state regulation. 55 Federal agency policy emphasizes
the crucial importance of state participation in siting decisions.156
Yet, federal agencies frequently fail to inform states of the intended
use of the site at the inception of the site exploration.' 57 In addition,
federal regulatory bodies often provide insufficient responses to state
concerns. 58 Consequently, local opposition may develop and result
and the concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a
facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels." 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F. (2) (1981).
This Article does not examine problems presented by the disposal of military wastes.
151. See generally Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling Nu-
clear Power, 64 GEo. L.J. 1323 (1976). For the reasons prompting states to challenge
exclusive federal regulation see notes 153-67 and accompanying text infra.
152. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
affdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); notes 173-77 and accompanying text infra.
153. Seiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposal: The Emerging Issue of States'Rights,
13 AKRON L. Rlv. 261, 273 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Emerging Issue].
154. See Note, Nuclear Waste Management: A Challenge to Federalism, 7 EcOL-
OGY L.Q. 917, 919-20, 931-36 (1979) [hereinafter cited asA Challenge to Federalism].
155. Atomic Energy Act § 274(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976).
156. The Department of Energy (DOE) is illustrative of the need for state cooper-
ation and participation. DOE is required by statute to give appropriate consideration
to the needs of states where proposed actions conffict with a state energy plan. 42
U.S.C. § 7113 (Supp. III 1979). In creating the DOE Congress sought to establish
effective mechanisms to allow direct participation of governments in energy policy
making. S. Rep. No. 164. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 854, 874. See generally Informational Hearings on Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing and Waste Disposal Before the California Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission 12-13 (Jan. 31, 1977) (statement of Dr. George W.
Cunningham).
157. See A Challenge to Federalism, supra note 154, at 933-36. ERDA did not
clarify whether proposed drilling in Michigan was exploratory in nature or whether
the site had been selected for waste disposal. Id at 934.
158. See generally SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
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in termination of the project.' 59
Federal efforts to manage temporary storage of radioactive wastes
have proven technically inadequate. 160  Numerous spills and leaks
have occurred at temporary disposal facilities.1 6' Such failures di-
minish public confidence in the federal government's ability to devise
a safe permanent disposal scheme. 162 As a result, state legislatures
often enact statutes which seek to exclude waste repositories.
States claim an interest in site selections because of potentially se-
vere rational health and safety effects. 163 Many states enacted laws
designed to prevent the federal government from locating reposito-
ries within those states. Some have attempted to do so by prohibiting
siting of repositories within the state unless their ban is overridden by
TIVES, PROPOSED NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE IN MICHIGAN 2-3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(Comm. Print 3 1977). A local congressman questioned the safety of an AEC project
in Kansas after AEC failed to give satisfactory responses. Id
159. Carter, Radioactive Wastes: Some Urgent Unfinished Business, 195 SCIENCE
661, 665 (1977) (describing that ERDA decided to suspend field studies when con-
fronted with state and local opposition to exploratory work). See generally A Chal-
lenge to Federalism, supra note 154, at 934.
160. The history of waste management is a record of errors and disappointments.
See generallyA Challenge to Federalism, supra note 154 at 923 (urging that the federal
government's poor record should move the federal government to adopt as extensive
regulatory control of waste management as has been adopted in other areas of nuclear
energy use); Gaps in the Regulatory Framework, supra note 150, discussing the serious
flaws in the federal government's regulatory framework for nuclear waste).
Uncertainty over the proper disposal techniques and the risks inherent in disposal
methods, leads some commentators to favor postponement of continued waste gener-
ation. Some go so far as to urge a ban on the construction of new nuclear power
plants. A Challenge to Federalism,supra note 154, at 917. Even if new plant construc-
tion is halted and presently operating plants are shut down, the wastes that will be
produced through defense and research activities will present a disposal problem. Nu-
clear Waste and Facility Siting Policy: Hearings on S. 594, S. 685, S. 701, and S. 797
Before the Comm on Energy and Natural Resources Part 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 42
(1979) (statement of John V. Evans).
161. See Gaps in the Regulatory System, supra note 150, at 7-11.
162. See Lash,A Comment on Nuclear Waste Disposal, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 267, 278
(1978) (citizens in states where site exploration announced perceive that ERDA's pro-
gram is inadequate).
163. See Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing
Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 43, 59-60 (1967) (arguing that the interest of
a state in public health and safety is so great that the state should not be precluded
from exercising regulatory authority); Recent Cases, 25 VAND. L. REV. 418, 424
(1972) (reasoning that states have a pressing and legitimate interest in protecting
health and safety of citizens); Note, Nuclear Waste Disposal A Federal and State
Problem, 65 Ky. L.J. 917, 931 (1977) (noting that local citizens feel that local officials
are better able to protect their health and safety interests).
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a vote of Congress. 164 Others states condition siting on approval by a
state agency, or one or both houses of the state legislature.' 65 Still
others prohibit the disposal within their boundaries of high-level
waste generated in other states.166 Enactment of such restrictions or
bans on repositories illustrates state dissatisfaction with present fed-
eral practices. 167
Despite such efforts at restricting repository site selection, states do
not possess legal authority to regulate or exclude repositories. 168
Under federal law waste facilities must be located on federally owned
land.169 The doctrine of federal property17 restricts state regulation
of activities on federal land.17 1 States may regulate federal property
164. Maryland, for example, forbids storage within the state of nuclear wastes,
"except as expressly otherwise required by Federal Law." MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43,
§ 689C (Supp. 1981). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chap. 21D, § 7 (West Supp.
1981).
165. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.45.025 (Michie Supp. 1980) (forbids siting of
nuclear waste facility unless (1) permit granted from Department of Environmental
Conservation, (2) legislature approves permit by concurrent resolution, (3) local gov-
ernment having jurisdiction over the territory in which the repository is to be sited,
approves the permit, and (4) the governor approves the permit); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-135 to -137 (Supp. 1981) (general assembly must find no "significant adverse
effect" on health before siting will be allowed); Ky. REV. STAT. § 211.852 (Supp.
1980) (siting conditioned on approval by Departments of Human Resources and Nat-
ural Resources & Environmental Protection, filing of environmental impact state-
ment, conduction of public hearings in the affected county, and approval by majority
vote of both houses of the state legislature).
166. See, e.g., Aasz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-691 to -696 (Supp. 1980) (prohibits
storage of waste from outside the state); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-11-201 (Supp. 1980)
(no out of state waste may be stored unless governor and general assembly approve).
167. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON
NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT (TID-29442) 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IRG RE-
PORT] (report arguing that views favoring state veto legislation are a product of dissat-
isfaction with the federal government's historic approach).
168. See notes 173-76 and accompanying text infra (discussion of federal
preemption).
169. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F(3) (1981).
170. The doctrine of federal property is rooted in U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 17.
The doctrine expressed in clause 17 provides that sites of governmental operations are
the property of the United States when control is essential to federal activities. See
S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946); Engdahl, State and FederalPower
Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 297 (1976) (finding that the property to
which clause 17 applies must be purchased with the state's consent).
171. Jaksetic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive IIigh-Lepel Waste Management, 9
ENVT'L L. 347, 395 (1979) (if the United States has exclusive jurisdiction under clause
17, any state attempt to regulate property is precluded).
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only when Congress clearly and unambiguously authorizes such reg-
ulation.' 72 No state regulation of federal property is permitted under
present law.
Federal law governing nuclear energy matters preempts state ef-
forts to frustrate the congressional goal of permanent waste dispo-
sal. 173 State regulation is preempted by Section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act'7 4 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. 7
In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,176 the Eighth Circuit held
that Congress asserted exclusive federal authority over high-level
172. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976). See also A Challenge to Federalism,
supra note 154, at 937.
173. The doctrine of preemption arises from the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution which elevates federal law above that of the states. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
Note, Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Permissible State Regulation
ofNuclear Facilities Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive
Waste Disposal, 11 TULSA L.J. 397, 397 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Permissible State
Regulation].
The essence of the supremacy clause is that the federal government may preclude
state regulation of matters within the realm of the federal government's enumerated
powers. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961). The federal law regulating nuclear
energy is based on an enumerated power-the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Only the commerce power could support the broad federal preemption found in
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), a f'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). For a discussion of preemption in the context of nuclear power,
see Parenteau, Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants: A Constitutional Dilemma/or the
States, 6 ENVT'L L. 675, 699-705 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Constitutional
Dilemma].
174. Atomic Energy Act § 274(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976).
The Atomic Energy Act presents a situation where the existence of a comprehen-
sive federal plan over a particular area raises a spectre of preemption. See Permissible
State Regulation, supra note 173, at 397.
The Eighth Circuit in Northern States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.
1971) affd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), relied on four factors to infer preemption of
nuclear energy: (1) the statutory language of the 1959 Amendments to the AEA
made it clear-Congress intended AEC to possess sole authority; (2) the existence of
federal regulations aimed at protecting health and safety; (3) the regulation of radio-
active waste requires a uniform framework by a national agency; and (4) independ-
ent state licensing would block the effectiveness of AEC. Id at 1146-47. See also
Recent Cases, 37 Mo. L. REV. 106, 108-15 (1972).
Contra, Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Pre-
empted? 7 Ecology L Q. 594, 679 (1979) (degree to which Congress preempted states
from regulating for purposes of protection from radiation hazards is still an open
question).
175. See Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and
the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976).
176. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aJ'dmetr, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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waste disposal through enactment of the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA). 17 7 Thus, states are constitutionally precluded from regulat-
ing or excluding repositories.
C. Proposed Legislation
During the Ninty-Sixth Congress several pieces of legislation were
introduced which could have removed obstacles preventing states
from effectively regulating disposal facilities. Congress will be con-
sidering similar legislation in its Ninty-Seventh session.' 78 This sec-
tion examines the legislation proposed during the past Congress in
order to discern potential changes in the role of states for future siting
decisions.
Congressional proposals of permanent waste repository legislation
fall into three basic categories: (1) proposals failing to explicitly
177. Id at 1154.
178. Several bills have been introduced during the 97th Congress addressing the
problems associated with nuclear waste repository siting. Senate Bill 1662 provides
for the selection of three sites for "testing and evaluation" (T&E) facilities by 1984,
with the President designating a final site by 1985. The bill anticipates the site will be
operational by January 1, 1981. The Bill recognizes some role for states in the siting
decision. A state's objection to siting will be sustained if one house of Congress passes
a resolution favoring the objection. "Away from reactor" (AFR) facilities-facilities
used for the storage of spent fuel rods--may be sited in a state despite objection if the
President chooses to override the state's objection. The Bill does not grant Congress
the power to disapprove the President's decision.
On the House side the Science and Technology Subcommittee has proposed a bill
entitled "The High-Level Radioactive Waste Management and Policy Act". The Bill
favors establishment of T&E facilities, with three sites selected within one year after
passage of the Bill. The Bill would allow a state to veto a siting decision if one House
of Congress approves the veto. As an inducement to state cooperation in siting, the
federal government will pay a state three-million dollars as soon as an area within the
state have been identified as a potential site. If a facility is constructed, the state will
receive federal payments of ten-million dollars annually until decomission of the fa-
cility.
House Bill 3809, sponsored by Congressman Udall, provides for a major role for
the states in repository siting. The Bill provides for the siting of permanent rather
than T&E facilities. Unlike the permanent facilities, T&E facilities are unlicensed by
NEPA. They involve elaborate and expensive testing before nuclear waste is brought
to the site. Environmentalists fear that because of the great expense in setting up the
T&E project, the government will be reluctant to find an established T&E facility
unsuited for storage of nuclear waste. The Bill prefers permanent siting in the hope
that more care will be exercised in initial siting decisions. In addition, the Bill allows
a state to veto a siting within the state, unless within ninty days of the veto both
Houses of Congress pass resolutions of disapproval.
[Vol. 22:317
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mention the role of states;' 79 (2) those providing states with a veto
power over the siting of repositories; 8 ° and (3) those allowing states
a consultation and concurrence power.' 8'
1. Legislation Ignoring State Interests
Senate bill 685182 (S.685) typifies proposals in the first category. 83
The bill would establish a comprehensive program for the long-term
storage of high-level waste. 184 Until a permanent disposal technol-
ogy is available, wastes would be maintained in temporary storage
facilities.'" 5 The Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
would select the technology and the sites for a system of permanent
179. See S. 685, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
180. For examples from the Ninty-sixth Congress, see S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (allowing veto by governor or state legislature); S. 701, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (allowing veto by governor or state legislature); H.R. 5923, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1979) (allowing veto by state legislature); H.R. 2762, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (veto by governor or legislature); H.R. 1791, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (veto
by governor or legislature); H.R. 1071, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (veto by legislature
or statewide referendum).
181. For examples from the Ninty-sixth Congress, see S. 1821, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (would establish a Nuclear Waste Management authority to develop a
waste disposal plan); S. 1521, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (state may disapprove and
submit objections on an individual basis); S. 1360, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Secre-
tary of DOE negotiates with state to establish concurrence); S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (establishes a Nuclear Waste Repository Review Panel which reports to
Congress); H.R. 4019, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (alternative to consultation and
concurrence); H.R. 3298, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (establishes a Nuclear Waste
Management Authority).
On February 12, 1980, the President by Executive Order established a State Plan-
ning Council. Its purpose is to effectuate a process of consultation and concurrence.
Congress must approve legislation to make the Council permanent. 126 CONG. REc.
H811 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1980) (message from President Carter).
Consultation and concurrence refers to a process by which individual states and the
federal government participates in an on going dialogue. See Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment Hearings Before the Subcomam on Energy Research and Production of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1979) (replies to ques-
tioning follows testimony of Warth Bateman).
182. S. 685, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). See note 179 and accompanying text
supra.
183. Id
184. S. 685, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1979) (establishes policy for long-term
storage of high-level waste, accelerates consideration of alternative technologies for
ultimate disposal, and improves efficiency of process for siting and licensing of nu-
clear power plants). See note 179 and accompanying text supra (discussion of S. 695).
185. S. 685, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 201 (1979).
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waste facilities' 86 subject to approval by Congress.'8 7 No provision
in S.685 delineates the authority of states. The bill does not specify
that the Secretary of DOE is to inform state officials of site explora-
tion. One may infer that S.685 envisions no change in the role of
states in nuclear waste disposal. Thus, the sole responsibility for sit-
ing remains with the federal government.
2. Legislation Granting States Veto Rights
Senate bill 144318 (S. 1443) is representative of the second category
of proposals permit a state to make the final decision regarding a
repository site.' 89 If enacted, S.1443 would require the Secretary of
DOE to notify the governor and leaders of the state legislature of
DOE's intention to explore potential repository sites within the
state. 90 Prior to federal exploration the governor may disapprove a
potential site by filing formal objections.'' The state legislature may
concur or issue a nonconcurrence in the governor's disapproval.' 9
2
The governor or legislature may suggest alternatives to the site under
federal consideration which could eliminate difficulties with the
site. 93 No federal exploration is permitted until state objections are
satisfactorily resolved.' 94 If state and federal authorities are cannot
186. Id § 102(c).
187. Id § 306.
188. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See note 180 and accompanying text
supra (discussion of S. 1443).
189. Id
190. See S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107B(a) (1979) (investigating potential
suitability for possible disposal); S. 701, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (before inves-
tigating any site for construction of facility); S. 594, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 242e (1979)
(intent to explore site for purpose of evaluation); H.R. 5923, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 107(g), 93a(l) (1979) (notify of a proposal to use a site); H.R. 2762, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 242A (1979) (intent to explore site for purpose of evaluation); H.R. 1791, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 5817(g) (1979) (notify of a decision or approval of a state); H.R.
1071, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (intent to investigate).
191. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107C(b) (1979). See note 180 and accompa-
nying text supra (discussion of S. 1443).
192. S. 1443, 96th Cong., Ist Sess § 107C(b) (1979).
193. Id. § 107C(a).
194. Id. (no federal action unless objection resolved); S. 701, 96th Cong., 1st Sess
§ 2 (1979) (if legislature or voters disapprove of proposed construction no further ac-
tivity permitted); S. 594, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 242e (1979) (no further proceedings
unless objection resolved); H.R. 5923, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 107(g)(3), 93b (1979)
(no further action if disapproval of site); H.R. 2762, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 242e
(1979) (no further proceedings unless objection resolved); H.R. 1791, 96th Cong., 1st
[Vol. 22:317
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resolve the dilemma, DOE is precluded from siting the respository.195
3. Legislation Allowing States Consultation
and Concurrence Power
Typical of the third category is Senate bill 742196 (S.742) which
allows states to participate fully in all siting procedures except the
final determination. 97 The bill would establish a Nuclear Waste
Management Planning Council (NWMPC) consisting of state offi-
cials and members of the public appointed by the President. 198
NWMPC, as an independent executive agency, would advise the
President and federal authorities on siting and other waste facility
issues.' 99 In addition, the bill would create a Nuclear Waste Coordi-
nating Committee (NWCC) comprised of federal officials." NWCC
would coordinate waste management activities by federal agencies.
An official of NWCC must notify the governor of the federal govern-
ment's intent to examine the suitability of land within the state for
use as a repository.20' After the NWCC notification, the governor
may establish a Nuclear Waste Repository Review Panel
(NWRRP).2 °2 The NWRRP, comprised of state officials,2" 3 would
evaluate the proposed site.2 ' NWCC in close cooperation with
NWRRP would prepare a repository analysis report.2 5 The gover-
nor as chairperson of the NWRRP may present the state's objections
Sess. § 5817(g) (1979) (no construction until approved); H.R. 1071, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 2 (1979) (if legislature or voters disapprove no further activity permitted).
195. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107C(e) (1979); S. 594, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 242g (1979); H. R. 2762, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 242g (1979).
196. See note 181 and accompanying text supra (discussion of S. 742).
197. Id
198. See S. 742, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 201 (1979).
199. Id § 201-03.
200. Id § 301.
201. S.1821, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § 405(a) (1979) (selection of a site); S. 1521, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1979) (prior to site exploration); S. 1360, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 242 (1979) (intent to explore); S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(e)(1) (1979) (study
for determination of suitability); H.R. 4019, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(a) (1979) (as
early as possible of proposed construction); H.R. 3298, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 203(b)
(1979) (when proposed to be a site).
202. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1979). See note 181 and accompanying
text supra (discussion of S. 742).
203. S. 742, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 403(a) (1979).
204. id §§ 401-03.
205. Id § 303.
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to selection of the site and offer compromise plans to NWCC.2 °6 The
NWCC must incorporate NWRRP comments in its final repository
report to Congress. Ultimately, Congress would be responsible for
the siting decision.2 °s
D. Analysis
The first category of proposed legislation,209 clearly, does not re-
spond to state opposition to nuclear waste repository siting. By
granting federal authorities sole responsibility for siting decisions, the
present problems would persist2 ° - states would continue to enact
laws that restrict or exclude repositories and federal agencies would
ignore the state concerns during site exploration. Local opposition
would increase, ultimately resulting in the failure to establish reposi-
tory sites.2"1 Eventually, federal courts would be compelled to decide
whether state law restrictions are preempted. 212 Preemption might
eliminate symptoms of the problem but it fails to deal with the
cause-an ineffective state role in siting decisions.21 3 Preemption, the
antithesis of state involvement, would only serve to exacerbate the
problems attendant to the absence of federal-state cooperation.
The federal government is understandably reluctant to invalidate
state laws on constitutional grounds. 214 Although preemption would
remove significant obstacles to the federal permanent waste pro-
gram,215 the preemption of state laws restricting site selection would
surely aggravate the federal-state relationship needed to effectively
deal with nuclear waste. To avoid antagonizing the states, the federal
206. S. 1821, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(g)(l) (1979) (filed with Executive Direc-
tor of Nuclear Waste Management Authority); S. 1521, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b)
(1979) (submitted to Chairman of NRC); S. 1360, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 242(b) (1979)
(fied with Secretary of DOE); S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1979) (submitted to
Nuclear Waste Coordinating Committee); H.R. 4019, 96th Cong., Ist Sess, § 11 (1979)
(submitted to Secretary of DOE); H.R. 3298, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 203(c)(1) (1979)
(submitted to Director of Nuclear Waste Management Authority).
207. S. 742, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 303 (1979).
208. Id § 303().
209. See note 179 supra.
210. See notes 154-67 and accompanying text supra.
211. See note 159 supra.
212. See note 173-77 and accompanying text supra.
213. See note 154 and accompanying text supra.
214. See .4 Challenge to Federalism, supra note 154, at 949.
215. Once held preempted, state laws are invalid and thus ineffective.
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government abandons projects when faced with local opposition.216
Nevertheless, such deference to local interests has practical limits. A
policy of deference cannot guarantee states significant involvement,
since federal authorities may at some time determine deference is not
in the public interest.2"' In addition, although state statutes barring
nuclear repositories may meet deference from the federal govern-
ment, such statutes may be susceptible to challenge by private par-
ties.2 8 Thus, an affirmative congressional grant of effective state
involvement must replace a policy of deference.
The second category of proposed legislation 2t'-legislation grant-
ing states a veto power over repository siting-creates several advan-
tages. The veto not only allows states the ultimate control of siting
but grants states substantial political leverage against the federal gov-
ernment.22° The veto permits states to exact concessions such as
financial and technical assistance in return for approval. A further
advantage is disclosure of information. Senate Bill 1443 requires that
federal agencies disclose all relevant information.221 In addition,
federal authorities must strictly comply with applicable regulations.
If states are not fully informed or involved a veto will result.222 Sen-
ate Bill 1443 also reduces the possibility of improper evaluations by
requiring detailed investigation before a state veto power is
invoked.223
Existence of a veto capability, however, creates problems for
elected state officials.2 24 Individuals opposing nuclear power might
pressure elected officials into vetoing repository sites. The threat of
216. .4 Challenge to Federalism, supra note 154, at 950 n.190.
217. See note 155 and 173-77 supra.
218. A private plaintiff with standing may challenge a state statute restricting nu-
clear power. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (employee of a utility company
has standing to challenge a state law prohibiting the licensing of nuclear power
plants).
219. See note 180 supra.
220. A Challenge to Federalsm, supra note 154, at 953 n.205.
221. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Seass. § 107B (1979).
222. Invocation of a veto registers state dissatisfaction with federal policies.
223. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107B (1979). See also Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment: Oversight Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 251 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearings] (comments of the Union of Concerned Scientists) (grant-
ing states a veto will insure the best choice for a site).
224. Nuclear Waste and Facility Siting Policy: Hearings on S. 594, S. 685, S. 701
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defeat at election time may persuade state officers to veto the best
available respository site.225 Conversely, interested parties may pres-
sure elected officials into approving a less than satisfactory site.226
Consequently, unchecked state political considerations pose a direct
threat to the welfare of all citizens.
Once a state invokes a veto, no further federal action is allowed.2 2 7
Senate Bill 1443 provides for an on going federal-state dialogue after
the state issues objections. 228 The federal government may reply to
the objections and suggest points of possible compromise. The state
may decide, however, to ignore federal proposals. Strained federal-
state relations will most likely result.229 Thus, existence of a state
veto does not permit the degree of state and federal cooperation
needed to solve the national nuclear waste storage problem.23 °
Finally, constitutional limitations apply even if states are specifi-
cally allowed to veto a site.23' If each state possesses absolute control
of siting within its borders, conceivably no state will allow construc-
tion of a repository. 32 To protect the use of nuclear energy from
being disabled by the states, the federal government must obtain a
judicial determination of whether state action is preempted.233 Al-
though state regulation or restriction of repository siting would likely
be held preempted by federal interests, strained state and federal re-
lations would result.2 34
and S. 797Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 293-433 (1979).
225. Id
226. Note, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 915, 933 n.123 (allowing a veto power may thwart
federal attempts to choose the best possible disposal site).
227. S. 1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107C(e) (1979). See note 34 and accompany-
ing text supra (discussion of S. 1443).
228. S. 1443, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 107C(e) (1979).
229. See notes 154-67 supra.
230. See IRG REPORT, supra note 167, at 95 (veto does not permit an on-going
dialogue).
231. See A Challenge to Federalism, supra note 154, at 952.
232. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 223, at 44 (statement of James Cubic)
(would result in Congressional or Presidential override). See also id at 252 (com-
ments of the Union of Concerned Scientists) (Congress could provide for an override
by the President or Congress).
233. Moran, Regulating Nuclear Waste Disposal: Has Illinois,4 Role? 68 ILL. B. J.
378, 381 (1980) (federal judiciary has developed a rule mandating preemption if state
action thwarts or prevents use of nuclear energy).
234. See notes 154-78 supra.
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The third category of statutory proposals respecting repository sit-
ing235 grants states a consultation and concurrence power.236 "Con-
sultation and concurrence" implies a continuing dialogue from the
inception of planning through operation of the site.237 If compelling
state interests are advanced, the likelihood of congressional approval
of a site is reduced.238 If a state presents persuasive technical or em-
pirical evidence against a repository, it will not be sited. Other con-
tentions, such as the proximity of large population centers, may
convince federal authorities to not choose the site.239
A number of commentators question the ability of state officials to
render independent decisions under a concurrence scheme. 240 Au-
thorities fear a rubber stamp role for NWRRP since it depends on
DOE for assistance and information.24' Unlike the veto situation,242
state approval is unnecessary because Congress makes the final deci-
sion whether to site a repository. 43 Thus, federal agencies need not
make full disclosure of data. Yet, strict regulations mandating full
disclosure could eliminate this problem. 2"
Under the consultation and concurrence proposal, Congress ulti-
mately must decide whether or not a repository is sited.245 Despite
the absence of a veto power a state may nevertheless stop repository
placements.246 As a practical matter, if a state does not want an in-
stallation, the repository is difficult to force upon it. Federal authori-
235. See note 181 supra.
236. Id
237. See IRG REPORT, supra note 167, at 95 (concurrence implies an on-going
dialogue during entire period of planning and operation).
238. See also Oversight Hearings, supra note 223, at 11 (statement of Rep. Udall)
(as a practical matter if states do not want an installation then it is difficult to force it
upon them).
239. See generally The Emerging Issue, supra note 153.
240. Oversight Hearings, supra note 223, at 262 (Comments of the Union of con-
cerned Scientists) (rubber stamp role for State Planning Council since dependent on
DOE for information).
241. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1979).
242. See notes 199 and accompanying text supra.
243. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979).
244. Federal agency compliance with regulations is subject to judicial review.
States by seeking judicial review of agency action could enforce strict regulations.
245. S. 742, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979).
246. Oversight Hearings, supra note 223, at 14 (testimony of John M. Deutch) (as
a practical matter a state can always stop something it does not want).
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ties hesitate to site waste repositories opposed by local residents. 24 7
Under any of the three legislative proposals, just as under present
law, the cooperation of state and local authorities is necessary for
successful waste management.
E. Conclusion
A cooperative effort between states and the federal government is
essential for a comprehensive nuclear waste disposal program.
Problems exist in the current regulatory framework for high-level
wastes. Presently, hazardous and risk-laden evaluations are sheltered
from direct state participation. States are willing to assume a more
meaningful role in waste regulation. Unless Congress grants states
an effective role in waste decisions, however, permanent repositories
will not be sited.
III. UNDERGROUND WASTE INJECTION .......... NANCY HENTIG
A. Introduction
During the 1970's public concern about the quality of the environ-
ment grew. Congress responded with several programs aimed at
studying and controlling man's effect on the environment.248 To pro-
tect the underground sources of drinking water,249 Congress passed
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA).25° The act's Under-
ground Injection Control Program" l enables the EPA to regulate a
major source of groundwater pollution in order to ensure safe drink-
ing water.252
The law has traditionally made a strict distinction between under-
247. See notes 153, 159 and accompanying text supra.
248. Some of the acts passed by Congress during the 1970's are The Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1976), The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1976), The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1977, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. 11977), and The Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
249. See Safe Drinking Water Act Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution of the Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, United
States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SDWA Oversight]
(statement of Thomas C. Jorling).
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
251. Subtitle C, Underground Injection Control Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300h
(1976).
252. See SDW Oversight, supra note 249, at 225 (statement of Jacqueline M.
Warren).
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